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POPULATION OF THE vJORLD AND ITS REGIONS,
1975-2050
The ｷ ｯ ｾ ｬ ､ population is now passing the 4 billion mark,
and at the present rate of increase it would double twice to
about 15 billion by the year 2050. Yet there are those who
say that it has already reached a ceiling and will do well to
maintain its present level; that shortages of all kinds,
especially of foodstuffs, will prevent further rise, even if
birth control does not. Many individuals already born will
be alive in the year 2050; it is hardly very informative to
know that they will be accompanied on the earth by between 4
and 15 billion people. The following pages are an attempt
to narrow the range.
The Future Is Uncertain
Until that future date arrives, any statement predicting
the number of people in the world or any part of its surface
in the year 2050 is soothsaying. The best that can be done
is to narrow the range somewhat, so that one does not have to
take account of all the possibilities between 4 and 15 billion,
but only of some of them. If the possibilities outside T to
9 billion could reasonably be excluded, we would have most
of the knowledge of the year 2050 now possible.
One way of limiting the range is to accept the high,
medium, and low variants of future population as published by
2the United Nations, the World Bank, the United states Bureau
of the Census, or some other agency. Evaluation of these
is rendered difficult by the absence of any underlying ratio-
nale. They appear to be based on extrapolation of birth and
death rates, and the calculation is elaborate and complex
enough that its method is not easily summarized. It will be
well to compare them with some simple calculations transparent
enough for immediate "understanding and criticism.
This paper will attempt to see what social, economic
and technical factors underlie present trends, and examine in
what degree it is possible to put bounds on the future. hie
shall see, for example, that the population of the year 2000
cannot but be close to 6 billion, say with 500 million varia-
tion in either direction, if major famines and wars are" avoirlcd,
but that the 2050 population can fall anywhere bet'tleen 7 and
9 billion. The spreading horn that expresses our ignorance
of the future is determined by the lesser uncertainty--at
least up to now--of death rates than of birth rates. We can
put narrower bounds on how many of the presently alive will
survive than on how many new people will be born. That is why
the horn spreads, and why it is impossible to penetrate the
veil of ignorance that separates 9 from 7'billion.
Finally we will make our own projection for the years
to 2075. It will be a long time before it is known whether
it is better than the extant projections, but it will at least
be clearly described and argued in detail.
3The Difficulties ｓ ｾ Ｒ ｲ ｴ With the Present
Table 1 shows for the past and the near future the
main facts of world population. During the last quarter of
this millennium population as a whole increar.;es about 8 t:iHtes,
population in the ri.ch countries about 6 times. From there
being 46 acres of ｴ ｾ ･ land surface of the planet for each of
us in 1750, there is to be only 6 acres in the year 2000.
When the presently rich countries were developing they grew
very rapidly and ｃ ｦ ｵ Ｗ ｾ to be 35 per cent of the earth's popu-
lation. The poor countries are now more than catching up,
and with 78 per cent of the planet in the year 2000 they \\,ill
have exceeded their proportion in the 18th century. Increases
in the latter part of the 20th century are "unprecedented in
history, especially the increase of the poor countries at 22
per thousand.
Too much should not be made of this comparison of rich
and poor based on present rates. Any competition between them
has a very different locus from population numbers. Both groups
have great impact on resources and hence on future welfare. A
world population that rises at 18 per thousand multiplies sixfold
in a century. If we project the rates for the poor (22 per thou-
sand) and the rich (9 per thousand) separately for the following
century we find an even greater increase: nearly 7 1/2 times.
An estimate of the future always comes out higher when executed by
separate components than projected as a total only.
But we can be sure that this amount of increase will
not occur, and in fact the United Nations medium estimate of
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TABLE 1 Summary of vlOrld population over 250 years
Number in millions
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
World 791 978 1262 1650 2501 6253
Rich countries 201 248 ·347 573 857 1361
Poor countries 590 730 915 1077 1644 4893
Per cent division between rich and poor countries
Rich countries 26 26 28 35 34 22
Poor countries 74 74 72 65 66 78
Per thousand annual increase
Total 4 5 5 8 18
Rich countries 4 7 10 8 9
Poor countries 4 5 3 8 22
Rich countries are Europe, Northern America, temperate South
America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
Estimates for 1750-1900 from Brass (1973); 1950-2000 from the
United Nations (1975) medium variant.
G.2 billion for the year 2000 is probably hi9h. The rich
countries are barely incrca.sing at all, and the poor count.rics
have come to tc!.ke bi::..th control ｅ ｾ ｣ ｲ ｩ ｯ ｵ ｳ ｬ ｹ Ｎ 'rhat t:11c worlc1-
total is likely to be less than 6 billion by the end of the
century will be shown below.
Even before starting to project the future the would-be
forecaster has difficulties. His first ob;,tacle in the v.'ClY
of estimating what the world population will be in the 21p.t
century is ignorance of its present amount and rate of grav,th.
As of 1971 only 10 per cent of the population of Africa, G
ｰｾｲ cent of ｴ ｾ ･ population of Asia, and 20 per cent of the
population of South p.merica were covered by complet.e birth
registration. At that the definition of completeness was a
modest one: that 90 per cent of births he registered.
The seven lursest countries as of now constitute 58
per cent of the world1s ｰ ｯ ｾ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ (Table 2). Their totals
at the jumping-off point are subject to errors of census-
taking. In the case of the United States the shortfall is
of the order of 2 per cent, measured by careful re-ennmera-
tion. other countries have less accurate censuses and Clre
less conscientious in carrying out independent checks on
enumeration. In some this may be offset by the better discip-
line of their populations. One can sayan the whole that the
numbers for 1970 in Table 2 are reasonably accurate, say well
within 5 per cent, but China is a conspicuous exception.
Since China contains hctvll"'cn one fi fth and one qU."1rtcr
of the Vlorld's population! its number ,mel ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ｣ ｾ ｳ Ｘ arc of ｾ Ａ ｲ ｣ Ｚ Ｇ Ｈ
5TABLE 2 Seven largest countries as estimated by the United
Nations (1976, medium variant) and projected to
the year 2000 (millions of persons)
1970 1980 1990 2000
China 772 908 1031 1148
India 543 694 876 1059
USSR 243 268 294 315
United States 205 224 247 264
Indonesia 119 155 197 238
Japan 104 118 126 133
Brazil 95 126 166 213
importance. The International Statistical Programs Center of
the U.S. Bureau of the Census gives 843 million for mid-1975,
an increase of 12 million from mid-1974. AID gives 7 million
increase at one extreme, and Dr. John Aird is quoted as an
authority by the Environmental Fund at the other extreme as
･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｧ an annual increase of 22 million. The World Bank,
quoting Chinese figures communicated to the World Population
Conference at Bucharest, gives 786 million as the mid-1972
level, and at a 1.B per cent growth rate China would be in-
creasing at 14 million per year. The united Nations has 772
million for 1970 and 839 million for 1975, higher than the
World Bank figure, as the following interpolation shows:
Gpopulation
(millions)
USAID about 840
US Bureau of Census 807
united Nations 798
World Bank 786
Environmental Fund
JI.nnual increase
(millions)
7
12
13
14
22
The United Nations figure apparently includes Taiwan with
some 15 million, and yet it is lower than the U'. S. Bureau
of the Census estirnate, \,,1. ich shovls Taiwan <:i.S a separate
entity.
The USAID estimate is provided by R.T. Ravenholt and
is pieced together from various items of recent evidence,
including corresp?ndence with Chinese officials, that shows
China's birth rate to have dropped to 14 per thousand by
1975, the large drop being in the 1970s. The death rate is
down to 6 per thousand on this calculation. It puts the level
of the Chinese population at 876 million in 1975, higher than
the others, but the absolute annual increase at only 7 million,
which is about half of what has been generally thought. A
difference of 7 million per year in China makes a difference
to the Chinese and the world population by the end of the
century of 175 million. Some resolution of the difference'is
plainly required.
Here and elsewhere there are signs that the united
Nations estimate is high, that it has not caught up with recent
7indications of falling birth rates. One example is the two
Germanyrs and Austria, shown as increasing where ｾ ｮ fact they
have started to decrease. The medium variant gives for
Austria a birth rate of 14.8 against a death rate of 12.4.
In fact the births are well below the deaths for 1975. On the
other hand the United Nations gives Nigeria a population of
55 million in 1970 and 63 million in 1975, while the World
Bank gives it 70 million in 1972. United states births are
shown at 16.2 per thousand by the United Nations for 1970-75
and at 17.2 for 1975-80. While no one can now say what the
quinquennium will average, yet the fact that the 12 months
ending August 1976 show a drop to 14.5 suggests that the 17.2
is hardly likely to be attained.
1.3 How Fast is the World Population Increasing Now?
The U.S. Bureau of the Census puts the total for mid-
1975 at 3,996 million and the annual growth rate between 1.7
and 1.9, which would make the annual increment 68 to 76
mi11ion. The United Nations is at the upper end of this in
respect of natural increase--it gives 18.7 for 1970-75 and
19.3 for 1975-80, an average of 19.0 per thousand, but it
applies it to a smaller base, 3,967 million in 1975, making
the increment 75 million. 'Especially to be noted is that this
increment according to the United Nations medium variant goes
above 101 million in the last five years of the century.
Once again the figures provided by R. T. Ravenholt of
USAID are much lovler. He finds for 1974 a world population
8total of 3,B80 million and a growth rate of 1.63 per cent, or
an increment of 63 million. And far from the increment being
on the rise, it is well past its peak of 70 million reached
in 1970 and is nOH headed dmvmvard.
The difference from the official UN and USBe figures
is dramatic. For even if there is no further fall, and the
figure remains at the present 63 million, by the end of the
century we will be 3880 + (63) (26) = 5518 ｭ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ rather than
the 6-plus billion that is found in other estimates.
1.4 The Peaking of the Rate of Increase
All estimates agree that at least the rate of increase
of world population is passing a maximum amd starting to
decline'. The United Nations puts the maximum at 19.3 per
thousand, and shows it as occurring in 'the quinquennium 1975-80,
which is to say at the ｰ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ ｮ ｴ moment. The developed countries
have been falling since World War II, while the less developed
as a whole reach their maximum of 23.6 in 1975-80. The
several continents are also reaching maxima about now, ･ ｸ ｣ ｾ ｰ ｴ
Africa, whose rate of increase keeps increasing until 1985-90,
again according to the UN medium variant, (Table 3).
TABLE 3 Annual rate of increase per thousand population, 1950-2000,
United Nations medium variant, assessed in 1973
:.:. ｾＮＺＺ］Ｚ］ＺＭｉｴｲｲ］ 0; = ｾ
Less
Developed developed Latin South
World countries countries Africa America Asia
1950-55 16.8 12.8 18.8 21.3 26.7 18.8
1955-60 18.3 12.6 21.1
.
23.1 28.0 22.4
1960-65 19.0 11.5 22.5 24.7 28.4 24.6
1965-70 18.6 9.0 22.9 25.8 28.0 24.9
-.
1970-75 18.7 8.0 23.2 26.5 27.7 25.2
ｾ
1975-80 19.3 8.0 23.6 27.7 27.8 26.1
1980-85 19.1· 7.8 23.1 28.6 27.5 25.6
1985-90 18.2 7.0 21.9 28.8 26.6 24.1
1990-95 17.3 6.1 20.7 28.6 25.4 22.0
1995-2000 16.2 5.7 19.2 27.7 23.9 19.5
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2.1 ｇ ｣ ｯ ｭ ･ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｣ Increase
Setting the 1975 world population P1975 at 4.0 biilion
and taking a rate of increase of 1.8 per cent per year, gives
for the year 2000
This is equal to the latest United Nations number for the
year 2000, and below the 6.5 billion presented earler for that
year. Yet one can argue that it is almost certainly too high.
For the present rate of 1.8 per cent per year will go down.
The time about now appears an historic high in the rate of
increase of world population. The reason why the rate of
increase must fall can be seen from the reason it has risen
up to now.
The Net Reproduction Rate Rp is the number of children
•
expected to be born to a girl child just born"
co
= J
o
l(a)m(a)da,
where l(a) is the probability that she lives to age a,
m(a)da the chance that she then has a child before age
a + da. RO is thus the ratio of the number living in one
generation to the number living a generation before, as implied
by the current rates of birth and death. If death is dis-
regarded we have GO ' the Gross Reproduction Rate, as the
same integral with the probability of surviving tea) omitted.
If oRO is the ratio of successive generations at the given
ratcsof birth and death, then GO is the expected family size
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of survivors at the given birth rates.
Then if we write
the first factor on the right is the suitably. weighted prob-
ability of survival to maturity, the second factor GO is a
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pure fertility indicator. Up to now the main change for many
｣ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｾ ｳ has been the fall in the first factor, survivorship,
while the second factor, fertiiity, has remained constant or
fallen slowly. The survivorship cannot go above unity, and
further declines in rnortality--those past childbearing ages--
make no great difference to the rate of increase. The rich
countries have attained a probability of ｳ ｾ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｶ ｯ ｲ ｳ ｨ ｩ ｰ to
maturity of about 0.97; the poor ones of about 0.90, except
in Africa. As the limit of unity is approached the rate of
increase of survivorship is bound to slow down. Any increase
12
in survivorship beyond the 1970s is almost certain to be off-
set by a greater. fall in fertility. This is shown in Fig. 1,
taken from United Nations data.
The conclusion is that projecting the 1975 population
at the 1. 8 per cent per year now shown, producing 6.2 million
by 2000, must be an overstatement. Let us see what happens
if we suppose a fall in the rate of increase.
2.2 . Declining Rate of ｉ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ｾ
For dealing with changing rates of increase we need an
expression that converts the trajectory ret) of the rate of
increase into a trajectory of the population. The definition
of r (t) is 1 dP (t)PT£T dt , and hence
t
In pet) = b r(u)du + constant,
so therefore
t
pet) = POexp(! r(u)du).
o
(1)
Use this to see what the ultimate world population
would be if the rate of increase declined in a straight line
to zero by the year 2050, starting at 1.8 per cent in 1975.
. .
By the end of the century the rate would be 1.2 per cent, by
2025 it woul"d be 0 6 t
.... • per cen •.
of time would be
The population at each point
t
13
t pt/109
1975 4.0
2000 5.8
2025 7.3
2050 7.9
Apparently the population in "the year 2000 would be 5.8, and
total subsequent increase for all time would be only a further
2 billion.
If everything is as above, except that the rate of
increase drops to zero by the year 2025, we have lower figures:
t
1975
2000
2025
5.6
6.3
so the ultimate population is only 6.3 billion.
2.2.1 Breakdown into DCs and LDCs
How much difference does it make if we break this down
-into more and less developed countries (DCs and LDCs)? Any
such division will raise the result, If the
drop to stationarity by the year 2050 starts with the DCs
increasing at 0.7 per cent an4 the LDCs at 2.4 per cent, we
have in billions
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Des LDCs Total
1975 1.1 2.9 4.0
2000 1.3 4.8 6.1
2025 1.4 6.5 7.9
2050 1.5 7.1 8.6
Now the ultimate stationary world population is 8.6 billion. Recog-
nizing heterogeneous subgroups has raised the outcome by 0.7 billion.
2.3 . Demographic Transition
As a further approach, consider the demographic transi-
tion, in which in country after country mortality falls and
this is followed after a longer or shorter time by a fall in
fertility (Fig. 2). Between time to and time t l the death
Number
b l
".' d1
t 1
Time
to
FIG. 2 A stylized version of the demographic transition
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rate d. goes from dO to d l and the birthcrate from b O
to b l • Call A the area bObldldO in Fig. 2. Then by
virtue of (1), since ret) = b(t) - d(t) is the difference
\
｢ｾｴｷ･･ｮ births and deaths, and
t l
= J [b(t) - d(t)]dt ,
to
then shows the increase from population at
to to population PI at t l • This is exact and does not
depend on the similarity of the fall of births and deaths.
But 110W let the birth and death curves fall in similar manner,
so that bet) is just d{t) displaced to the right. Let L
be. the lag in the fall of births behind the fall in deaths,
and R be the common range of birth and death. Then
LRPI = POe • If the lag L is 20 years on the average and
R = 0.03, we have
Po = 4.0e 20 {0.03) = 7.3 billions.
Let us disaggregate into less and more developed.
Suppose 30 per cent further increase for the developed, and
30 ｹ ｾ ｡ ｲ ｳ Ｇ lag in the demographic transition of the less devel-
oped. Then
DCs
LDCs
1.1 x 1.3
2 9 e 30{0.03)• x
Total
= 1.4
ｾ
= 7:1
8.5 billions,
or abbut the same as the disaggregated version with rate of
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increase r (t) falling in u straisht line to Ｒ Ｐ ｾ Ｂ ［ ｏ Ｎ vJork by
budley Kirk has shown that recent demographic transitions
have taken place more reapidly than early ones, and if this
continues to be true 30 years is an upper bound for the future.
2.4 The Principle of Momentum
The above has taken little account of age. respite
experimenting that showed that projections without age came
equally close to the true number that emerged 10 ｯｾ 15 years
later, one ought nonetheless to examine the effect of momentum
due to age distributions being favorable to births following
a long period of high fertility. If a country drops to zero
fertility at a moment when its birth rate is b, its expecta-
tion of life ｾ ｯ Ｇ its rate of increase r, and its mean age
of childbearing p, then the ratio of its ultimate stationary
population to that at the moment of fall is
or if b = 0.040, ｾ ｏ = 60, RO = 2.5, we have the ratio 1.52.
If the less developed countries increase for an average
of 20 years at an average rate of 2.4 per cent, then drop to
bare replacement, their population will be
(2.9) (1.024) 20 (1.52) = 7.1.
••J'
.. Adding 1.4 for the developed countries gives 7.1 + 1.4 = 8.5
billions.
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2.5 Stationarity
The number of births in the United states has been just
over 3 million during this decade despite a very large cohort
of women of childbearing age, themselves the outcome of
I
cohorts of over 4 million during the 1950s. As the number of
childbearing couples begins to taper off in the 1980s we can
expect some fall in the number of births. But this may not
occur; it is possible that the falling off in the number of
persons of childbearing age will be offset in some degree by
an increased average family size, though no one can be sure.
On the other hand there are still some unwanted births, and
these are certain to be reduced both through better contra-
ceptive methods (a once-a-monthpill for women and a pill for
men would help) and through better dissemination of existing
methods. If 3 million turns out to be the level of births in
the United States, and if the expectation of life for the
average of both sexes climbs to 75 ｾ Ｌ then the long-run
.stationary population of the United states will be exactly
the product of these two, or 225 million.
Similar calculation can be made for other countries
whose birth levels have fallen nearly to stationarity, which
is to say, in the long run just offsetting deaths. In West
Germany and Austria the current births are less than current
deaths. If West Germany's births rise to 700,000 and continue
at that level, and are associated with an expectation of life
of 75 years, the resulting stationary population would be
52.5 ｾ ｩ ｬ ｬ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ or 10 million fewer than are now present.
18
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For Europe and the Soviet Union as a whole the corre-
sponding level for births may well be of the order of 12
million per year. This would correspond to a total population
of 12 x 75 = 800 millions, against the 728 millions shown
for 1975 by the u.s. Bureau of the Census.
Adding the 3 million births of the United states, 2
million for Japan, 12 million for Europe and the USSR, 1
million for canada,' Australj.a, etc., gives 18 million births
per year for the developed countries. The ultimate stationary
population to which these point is 1,350 million. This com-
pares with 1,132 million estimated for the same developed
countries for mid-1975 by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It
says they have less then 20 per cent more to climb before they
reach their permanent high. That some such relatively lmv
ultimate total seems likely is argued in detail below. Cal-
I.
culations of this kind, that can be done on the back of an
envelope, have the advantage of-being immediately understand-
able and therefore subject to critical judgment.
3 How Accurately Can the Future Be Known?
Serious projections provide a range for any future date,
and the succession of ranges fans out as one goes fon.'ard in
time. The fan or horn takes its characteristic shape from
the fact that ｳ ｵ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｶ ｯ ｲ ｳ ｾ ｩ ｰ among the living population has,
at least in the past, followed a clear trend, while births
are subject to such large fluctuations that the trend is hard
to separate out. As the projection goes for-yard in time the
births subsequent to the jumping-off point make up a ｾ｡ｲｧ･ｲ
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and larger part of the population. By the year 2000 more
than one half of the world population will have been born
since 1975, by the year 2025 nearly 80 per cent. It is on the
number of thcse births that the main effort of the forecast
must be centered.
As an example of the fan estimated long enough ago that
we can now form some judgment as to where the performance will
lie within it, consider Table 4, showing United Nations esti-
mates made in 1968. The gradually widening range ends with
a low of just under 6 billion and a high of just over 7 billion
for the year 2000. It now appears that the low figure is
closer to the mark. Births in both developed and less devel-
oped countries fell faster than was anticipated by extrapola-
tion of pre-19G8 trends. The 1963 assessment was probably
more accurate than that of 1968--its low was 5,449 million
and its high 6,994 million. Besides being more accurate in
having the ,·dder range stretching much further on the 1mV' side,
the 1963 estimate was more modest in allowing a wider range,
which is to say, a wider allowance for ignorance.
The range--somewhat over 1.1 billion. between low and high
or 10 per cent ｾ ｡ ｣ ｨ way from the ｭ ｾ ｡ ｮ in 1968, and 1.5 billion
or 12 per cent in 1963--reflects correctly the accuracy with
which such estimates can be made, if one wishes to have a
one half to two thirds chance of straddling the true figure.
In recent years the United Nations has stressed. the
medium variant of its ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｡ ｩ Ｚ ･ ｾ tending to neglect the high
and low varihnts. This is what many of its customers want--
, "
ｾｨＳｌｅ 4 The fan of uncertainty as assessed by the United Nctions in 1968 (millions of persons)
ｾ Ｍ Ｂ ］ Ｇ ］ Ｍ ｾ Ｎ ｾ ｟ Ｎ ｟ Ｂ Ｂ Ｍ Ｍ Ｂ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ］ ］ Ｍ ｾ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ Ｂ Ｂ Ｇ Ｍ ］ ］ ］ ］ ...ｾ］ＢＢＢＧ］ｾ］］］］］］］］］］］］］］］］］ｾ］ｾＬ, =- == = .-= - - _.. -_. --
High variant I1ediurn variant
Less Less
developed Developed developed Developed
Date countries countries Total countries countries Total
1965 2252 2252 1037 3289
197:) 2564 2542 1090 3632
1930 3379 4589 3247 1210 4457
1990 4425 5761 4102 1336 5438
.."
2000 5650 7104 5040 1454 6494
LO\v variant
Less
developed Developed
countries countries
2252
2523
3137
3820
4523
Total
4347
5156
Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｍ
':J -' I I
N
o
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the best guess than can be made on each future year, so that
they can use the figure without thinking too much about it.
Yet the range is a way of informing the customer as to how
much he can rely on the medium variant, and its partial aban-
donment must be reckoned as a step backward.
Table 5 shows the 1980 population as estimated at
various times from 1951 to 1973. The first estimates were
much too low, and successive estimates kept rising to a peak,
reached in 1968, when 1980 w. s estimated at 4,457 million
persons. Since then the United Nations revision has been
downwards. It is more than possible that the lower 1973 fig-
ure will also prove high. It is understandable that forecasters
should change their numbers as new data keep appearing, and
that they should be influenced hy such facts as the trend
towards acceptance of ｣ ｯ ｮ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｣ ･ ｰ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｾ in developing countries.
As a rough way of describing the uncertainty fan, the
high estimate of Table 4 supposes an average 2.7 per cent per
year increase fOL the less developed countries, and the low
estimate 2.0 per cent. This range could well prove too narrow
to have a two thirds probability of straddling the number
that will be counted in 1980. The U.S. Bureau of the Census,
estimating the year 2000 in 1974, shows an average annual
increase of 1.17 per cent for the high variant and 0.55 per
cent for the low. This also could prove too narrow.
The forecaster is in a dilemma. He wants to be useful
to his client, yet he is aware that forecasting is difficult.
If he gives a realistic range for 2/3 confidence the client
22
TABLE 5 Estimates of 1980 world population
(millions of persons)
Date Low Medium High
1951 2976 3636
1954 . 3295 3990
1957 3850 4220 4280
1963 4147 4330 4550
1968 4347 4457 4589
1973 4374
would scorn his nllinbers, even though no better numbers are
to be had.
One can obtain some impression of the degree to which
further data influence the forecast by studying successive
revisions, for example as these affect ､ ｾ ｶ ･ ｬ ｯ ｰ ･ ､ and less
developed countries in Table 6.
TABLE 6 United Nations medium variant of population in the
year 2000 as assessed at various dates (millions)
Assessed in
1963
1968
1973
World
6130
6494
6254
More developed Less developed
1441 4688
1454 5040
1360 4894
1."3
rfABLE 7 Estimates of world population to the year 2050 from
three publications (millions of persons)
Source 1975 2000 2025 2050
united Nations, with
data up to
1968 High 7104
Hedium 6494
Low 5977
1973 High
Medium 3968 6254
Low
World Bank
Projection A 4019 5916 8136
Projection. B 4042 6690 13444
Frejka
Bare replacement by
2000-2005 4007 5922 8172
2020-2025- 4022 6422 10473
2040-2045 4030 6670 13024
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4 Existing Forecasts by Region
Few serious published estimates are available for the
21st century, even for the world as a whole, and fewer yet.
are to be had by regions. Some of these are shmm in 'rable 7.
The United Nations estimates stop at the year 2000.
The World Bank (1972) goes much farther. Its work is based
on an early version of the Frejka (1973) projections, the main
contribution of the Bank being selection of two'of the Frejka
projections that may be considered realistic. The low esti-
mate, called A, supposes that the average of fertility in the
world will drop linearly to bare replacement by 2000-2005, and
the high estimate B ｳｵｰｰｯｳｾｳ that this condition will not be
reached until 2040-45.
The "lorld Bank Projection A gives population in the
year 2000 as 5,916 million and in 2050 as 8,136 million. It
will later be argued that this is a reasonable medium figure.
The Bank contrasts it with Projection D, that gives ｴ ｨ ｾ 2000
population as 6,690 million and the 2050 as 13,444 million.
The ultimate stationary world population, reached about 2100,
is nearly double on Projection B what it is on projection A:
15,815 mi11ion against 8,386 million, but this is beyond our
scope.
The 2050 figure designated A increases from 1975 at an
average rate of 0.95 per cent per year, while B increases at
1.62 per cent per year.
For our purposes it is convenient to recognize six
groups of countries. These arc shown in Table 8, and may be
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TABLE 8 Groups of countries as assembled for projection,
with mid-1975 population as estimated by the
U.s. Bureau of the Census (thousands of persons)
United States and countries
of British settlement
Socialist countries of
eastern Europe, including
the USSR
United States
Canada
South Africa
Australia
New Zealand
Total
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic
Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
. USSR
ｙ ｾ ｧ ｯ ｳ ｬ ｡ ｶ ｩ ｡
Total
Petroleum exporters
Algeria
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
213,631
22,811
25,087
13,520
3,096
2,411
8,741
14;804
16,885
10,541
34,022
21,245
254,300
21,346
384,295
15,684
7,041
519
139,421
34,903
11,060
1,007
2,437
Nigeria
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
Total
Developing countries--
incomes of more than
$400 GNP per capita
in 1972
Argfmtina
Barbados
Brazil
Chile
Republic of China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Fiji
Guatemala
Guyana
Hong Kong
Israel
Jamaica
Lebanon
Malaysia
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Singapore
Trinidad
. Uruguay
Total
61,072
6,231
Ｑ Ｒ Ｌ Ｘ ｾ Ｑ
294,14G
25,911
231.
106,97G
10,58S
16,0 -j G
25,8J.::,
1,9G7
Ｙ Ｌ Ｒ ｾ ﾷ ［ Ｗ Ｎ
4,907
57:>
6,0/7
786
4,339
3,437
Ｒ Ｌ ｏ ｦ Ｌ ｾ Ｌ
2,6:;·()
12,3(,8
59,23H
2,260
1,674
15,tleC
2, Ｒ ｾ Ｉ 1
974
3,059
321,000
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summarized \>lit.h 1975 totaJsin millions as givc=n by tlle U.S.
Bureau of the Census:
\'lorld
United States and countries
of British settlement
Western Europe and Japan
Socialist countries of eastern
Europe, including the USSR
Oil exporters
Develoninq countries of more than
... -
$400 GNP per capita in 1972
Less developed countries of less
than $400 GNP per capita in 1972
3996
278
463
384
294
321
2249
All of these groups but the last, ｾ ｨ ｩ ｣ ｨ is residual, are
listed in some detail in·Table 8.
5 The Developed Countries
In traditional societies, for example those of lIfricCl
on which John Caldvlell (1976) has generalized, the flmy of
wealth was from young to old as long as the old lived; only
at the moment of death did the accumulated wealth revert to
the young. With modernization the flovl of wealth is reverscj:
the young are raised and educated by the old and have no
obligations after maturity. This is functional for dynamic
societies, in which the independence of the.young fits well--
inheritance is unimportant for them. But cOl,bineo \..;i tJ the
loss by the family of its productive activities, this ｲ ｾ ｶ ･ ｲ ｧ ｾ ｬ
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of the flow of wealth removes ancient incentives to have mDny
children. It acts in the same direction as the weakening of
family solidarity, evidenced by a high frequency of divorce.
Divorce has increased especially during the past decade.
In the United States divorces numbered 264,000 in 1940, rose
gently and ｳ ｯ ｾ ･ ｷ ｨ ｡ ｴ irregularly to ｾ Ｗ Ｙ Ｌ Ｐ Ｐ Ｐ by 1965, then
jumped to 708,000 in 1970 and to 970,000 by 1974. At first
it seemed that the war and its aftermath were causing the
increase, but apparently the cause is more basic.
At one time the family, at least in the middle and
upper classes, was held together by the property that it shared.
In all classes it was held together by men having so great an
advantage in the labor market that a woman was better off
sharing a man's income than having the whole of any income she
could independently earn. Mores and laws made divorce dif-
ficult; divorced persons were regarded as somewhat tainted.
And as an aspect of the circularity that prevails in such
matters, the family was held together by the many children
that it had. All of these things have changed during the
past generation, and they seem to have changed especially
rapidly between the 1960s and 19705.
The prominence of dlvorce as a possibility in the minds
of couples acts as a brake on childbearing. If there is even
a chance that the couple \'lill break up, they don't want
children. Having custody of a child is a handicap to either
partner equally for work and for remarriage.
Women now derive their identity in large part from
their jobs, j Hf; t a:-:i men have always done. The fraction of
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married women in the labor ｛ ｏ ｬ Ｇ ｃ Ｈ ｾ ｲ ｯ ｳ Ｈ ｾ from 22.0 per cent in
1948 to 40.8 per cent in 1970; among those Hith children unde):
6 years of age the rise vlaS even s.teeper---frorn 10.8 per cent
to 30.3. Over the longer. term numhers are provided by the
censuses; of women 25-44 years of age only 15.1 per cent par-
ticipated in the labor force in 1890, and 47.5 per cent by
1970.
Effective equality for women is an aspiration rather
than an achievement. Average wages for men in 1974 were $204
per week, and for women $124, taking fulltime workers in all
industries and occupations together. Whatever the breakdown,
it seems that men earn about 50 per cent more than women, a
ratio that changes very little as One goes back thr"ough time
to the 1920s, when ｡ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ｧ ･ earnings for men were $0.55 per
hour, and for women $0.36. The statistics show either that
women are doing different and less skilled work than men or
that they are paid less for the same work; probably both are
true. When jobs like bank teller, once sex-typed as male and
now in considerable part performed by women, make the changeover
they change their character and, one suspects, relative pay
goes ､ ｏ ｜ ｴ ｭ ｾ Sex-typing is universal; there are not many kinds
of work that are indifferently performed by men and by Homen.
What is defined as women's work varies over place as well as
over time. In the USSR women can become physicians, and the
majority of physicians are indeed women, which seemingly favors
equality, except that physicians are pa{d a small fraction of
what they re-ceive in America. But "lhether equal de facto or
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not, that women seek equality, and seek careers such as men
have, is clearly associated with small families. It might he
tha t the disinclination to have children is \\That makes women
seek jcbs, cr the interest in jobs causes them to refrain
from having children; but \vhatever the direction of association,
the correlation is high. There seems little distinction on
this bebleen socialist and capitalist societies.
It is worth repeatins that the decline in childbearing
depends on the aspiration of women to equality rather than
the ｡ ｣ ｨ ｩ ･ ｶ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ of equality. When a couple breaks up remarriage
is far more di fficul t for the "vomen, partly for the demographic
reason that male mortality is higher. In the United States
primary individuals, ､ ･ ｦ ｩ ｮ ｾ ､ as household heads living alone
or with non-relatives only, included in 1970 7,882,000 women
and only 4,:(163,000 men. While a.ge differences b!;tween pa.rties
to first marriages are sma.ll, on their second marriage men
tend to find younger women, and in a society in which youth
is desirable this is in itself a sign of male dominance.
We are dealing here with a complex of apparently
inseparable factors. The acceptability of divorce is asso-
ciated with increased equality for women in the labor market;
the labor market activities of women are associated with their
wish to have fewer children; their having fewer children makes
it easier for couples to break up. That complex by which
women aspire to be like men, in that they attiin their identity
through a job or career rather ｾ ｨ ｡ ｮ through their position in
ｴ ｨ ｾ family, ｾ ｡ ｵ ｳ ｣ ｳ them to value their time in monetary terms,
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and so children become expensive. This contrasts with earlier
times when children were a primary value and going out to work,
even if opportunity offered, would have seemed too ｣ ｯ ｾ ｴ ｬ ｹ in
terms of the children ｾ Ｑ Ｐ would have to be sRcrificed for it.
All this is superimposed on, and carries to an extreme,
those characteristics of the family that are congruent with
industrial socie·ty. On the one hand it has given up the pro-
duction of most cowmodities and even services to outside
agencies, so that the education, clothing, even feeding of
the children is a cost in the family's external balance of
payments, and on the other hand it does not have any "'lay of
ｰ ｵ ｴ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｧ its children to work in producing anything useful to
itself or salable to others. Also the requirement of education
takes the time of the child while young, not to mention the
fact that he could not be put to work before the age of about
20 for lack of skills.
The operative question for prediction of fertility is
the durability of the social trends above described. Some
judgment is required on whether divorce, women's liberation,
easy contraception and abortion, and other present conditions
conducing to low fertility are permanent or transient. Much
of what has been said above, after all, is rationalization
after the fact of a falling birth rate. If a rise in the
birth rate were to occur it would be explamed as due to the
reassertion of the durable values of the "family against the
materiali. m and immorali ty of the early 19 70s. r.l!ost writers I
however, find it difficult to imagine such a reversal.
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5.1 Distinguishing Fluctuations From Trends
In developed countries fertility has come to be subject
to the business cycle, and fluctuates with employment and
earnings prospects. Such fluctuations make very tenuous any
conclusions drawn from single months. US births for August 1976
at 277,000 are distinctly dov.m from births in August 1975,
which were 288,000. Comparing the 8 months ended in August
we have 2,067,000 in 1976 against 2,099,000 in 1975, agnin a
drop. Comparing the year ended August we find for 1976
3,117,000 against 3,206,000 for 1975. As a ratio to popula-
tion the fall is proportionally greater, since the population
had been increasing somewhat over the time:
1973 15.2 per thousand
1974 14.8 per thousand
1975 15.1 per thousand
1976 14.5 ·per thousand
all for the 12 months ended Augvst.
One has to be careful not to over-interpret the latest
figures. On the basis of the 1975 rise Berkov and Sklar
(1975) anticipated a new trend which the 1976 figures failed
to confirm; I would like to avoid predicting a new fallon
the basis of the 1976 figures alone.
Note that these rates are much belov] the 10\'1 of the
19305, which came in 1933 with 18.4 births per thousand
population.
Taking account of age distribution would make recent
figuros stand out even more. Now is when the baby boom
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babies are at the hcislht of their reproduction. 'I'he peak of
post \,,'ar births having come in 1961, we C,ln expect the numher
of potential mothers to start declining soon.
A question more important nUIT.crically for the future
of world population is the extent to which the same causes
of fertility reduction will occur in less industrialized
societies. We cannot expect quite the same pattern, and it
appears indeed that some very different forces are operating.
To these we now turn.
6 The Less Developed Countries
What speed of decline of the crude rate of natural
increase can poor countries realistically expect? This abovc
all will determinc the world population in the 21st century.
What kind 0.£ evidence will permit a forecast of the decline?
Costa Rica has been cited as a horror story of rapid
ｩ ｮ ｣ ｲ ･ ｡ ｳ ･ Ｌ ｡ ｮ ｾ still is by writers who have not looked at the
numbers reoently. Despite prosperity, its rate of increase
was over 3.5 per cent per year into the 19605. But then its
birth rate fell from 44.9 to 37.3 per thousand population in
1960-65; at the same time its death rate fell from 9.2 to
7.3. The net outcome was a fall in the rate of natural in-
crease from 35.6 to 30.0, or somewhat more than 1 per thousand
per year. By 1974 its rate of increase was down to 24 per.
thousand, v:ith births at 28 and deaths at 5. If births were
to fall at 1 per thousand per year it would take only about
15 years to reach stationarity, for its crude death rate would
ri s(\ as its ratc"" of ｩ ｮ ｃ ｲ ｃ ｡ ｦ ｾ Ｈ ｾ slO't!C'd.
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Costa Rica's fall in the 196Gs Vlas not by any means a
record. In the 20 years from 1954 to 1974 Singapore's rate
of increase dropped from 4.5 per cent to 1.4, Hong Kong's
from 3.0 per cent to 1.1 in the decade of the 19605.
But for each such case there is more than one in which
the birth rate is either stubbornly high or else its fall is
matched by that of the death rate. India's births fell from
44 to 40 per thousand during the 19605, but its deaths fell
from 20 to 16, and about the same seems to be true of Indonesia.
Since it is the large countries that mostly determine the
totals for the less developed world, and the increase of these
is gently rising to a (forecast) peak in 1975-80, follow8d by
a gentle decline to the end of the century of little more
than 1 point per thousand in each 5 years, according to the
United Nations, it could take 75 ｹ ｾ ｡ ｲ ｳ for the poor countries
as a whole to reach stationarity.
6.1 Relation of Mortality and Fertility
As among continents and countries, those in which the
birth rate is high tend to be those \-lith high death rates.
Rates per thousand for 1970-75, as estimated by the United
Nations, are
Natural
Births Deaths increase
Africa 46.3 19.8 26.5
Latin America 36.9 9.2 27.7
south Asia 41.9 16.7 25.2
ｶ ｨ Ｚ ｾ ｳ ｴ ｣ ｲ ｮ South Ilsia 42.8 14.3 28.6
Less ｣ Ｑ ･ ｾ Ｌ ﾷ ｣ ｬ ｯ ｪ Ｎ Ｎ Ｎ ＾ ･ ｣ Ｑ re'Jions 37.5 lil.3 23.2
These areas arc at very different stages of: economic and
sanitary progress, yet their rates of increRse are similar.
Africa's deutl1 rates Ｌ ｾ ｲ ･ 10 per ｴ ｨ ｯ ｵ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｬ ｮ ｣ Ｑ higl!cl: than Latin
America's, and so a:r-e its birth rc:d.-.es (Demeny, 1974) .. For
how long into the future CQn birth and death rates fall to-
gether, so that population growth continues at its present
rapid pace?
The expectation of life for Africa was estimated at
36.1 years for 1950-55, and it seems to have risen almost 1/2
a year per year until 1970-75, when it is estimated at 45.0
years. While this may seem low in present American terms, it
is well to note that at the beCjinning of the 20th century the
United States expectation of life was 47.3 years. South Asia
shows 48.5, a level attained in the United States after 1900.
Latin America at 61.0 is doing bp.tter than the United Stat.es
until the early 19305.
Yet parallel trends of birth ilnd deu·th rates cannot
continue, and even if they did the rate of increase would slow
down. The rate bf increase of expectation seems to press
against a ceiling at about 75 years for females. With or
without such a ceiling, the fraction of children that pass
reproductive age comes to ｾ ｸ ｣ ･ ･ ､ 0.9 as &0 for females
passes 70, and so cannot rise much more even if expectation
of life continues upward. Fig. 1 shows that 150 , the chance
of surviving to age 50 goes up more or less irr a straight
line vli th oCo ( and then is forcod to bend sharply.
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6.2 Empirical Evidence on _yertilit.:;L
Since complete statistics are not to be had, we must
depend on fragmentary items of evidence now corning to light
to judge ｷ ｾ ｡ ｴ the birth rate is the Third World is doing.
Some of these items suggest that it has started a precipitous
decline.
Under the World Fertility Survey Thailand has carried
out a retrospective survey, so far not released by the govern-
ment. Confidential figures from that survey show for the
total fertility rate (approximately the number of children
that would be born to surviving \olOmen if the current birth
rates cO:ltinued)
1960 6.6
1968 6.1
1972 5.3
1973-4 4.3
The rapid fall in the 1970s ｣ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｳ ｴ ｳ with the slow decline of
the 1960s.
In Indonesia a united Nations supported vital registra-
tion experiment used a dual record system in 10 areas, spread
widely through Bali and East Java, though not a proper random
sample. The result was a total fertility rate of 3.3, while
Central Java showed 3.7; meanwhile Sumatra, where no birth
control has been promoted and where the rates have always been
higher, showed over 6. As among the 10 places' a reassuring
correlation appears betwEen family planning activities and the
fa]} of the birth rate.
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In the Philippines Father Madigan of xavierUniversity
has carried out surveys in a rural part of Mindanao during
1971-75. He found tha'c the birth ratc{ as high as 45 per
thousand in 1972, had fallen to 30 in 1975. Also in the Phil-
ippines, 7 provinces are heing studied by a team that includes
Father Madigan, ｾ ･ ｲ ｣ ･ ､ ･ ｳ Concepcion of the University of the
Philippines in Manila, and Father Wilhelm Flieger at San Carlos
University in Cebu. 'fheir preliminary figures show a signi-
ficant downtrend during the 1970s.
In Colo;". ia the 1973 census had a question on date of
birth of the youngest child, and if the child was born in the
preceding 12 months questions were asked to ensure complete
returns. The outcome seems to be a crude birth rate of about
33 per thousand, which is about 10 per thousand ｬ ｯ ｾ ･ ｲ than
was found in the 19605.
6.3 The Demographic Transition
The demographic transition is the process by which high
death rates and high birth rates give way to low rates. In
Paul Demeny's (1968) lapidarye>'·pression: "In traditional
societies, fertility and mortality are high. In modern soci-
'eties, fertility and mortality are low. In ｢ ･ ｴ ｷ ･ ･ ｾ there is
demographic transition." Taking for granted that the transi-
tion either has gone to completion or will do so in every
country, the important question is by how many years the fall
in births will follow the fall in deaths. If it is 10 years
the population will typically increase by about one ｴ ｨ ｩ ｲ ､ ｾ if
it is 100 years the increase will be 20-folo. Thus our objectivG
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of narrowing the range of possibilities for the 21st century
is not helped by tIle general concept of a demographic transi-
tion: it would be ｧ ｾ ｳ ｡ ｴ ｬ ｹ helped by any evidence on the time
interval beb-!een -the fall in deat.hs und that in births.
Several i teE"';:'; of evidence do bear on the matter. Dudley
Kirk found that the more recent the transition the more ｱ ｵ ｩ ｣ ｊ ｾ ｬ ｹ
it takes place. The slopes of the lines representing birth
and death rates are more sharply downward, and the birth curve
seems to lag less behind the death curve. The matt.er has been
studied by Father Wilhelm Flieger (1967). In Sweden births
fell long after those in Britain, and in tre years 1900-30
fell by 13.6B per thousand population; births in England and
Wales dropped by 8.13 per thousand in 1870-1900 and by 10.35
in 1900-30. The evi.dence is no-t altogether unambiguous, but
on the whole the nuniliers encourage us to think that future
transitions will take place more quickly.
This would follow if the transition is closely tied to
the rate of economic expansion, for this takes place more
rapidly now than it did in the past. Rates of economic advance
of 6 and 8 per cent per year, recently exceeded by Japan and
Brazil, are common today, whereas 2 or 3 per cent per year
"las doing well in the 19t_h century.
The attitudes of elites-and publics to birth control
are changing quickly. During the 19605 the attitudes in many
poor countries were reminiscent of that of France in the early
20 Ul century ",lhen 5he vl2.S in mil i tary-c1emographic competition
",lith Cermany. Lat:in American newspapers, reported on by
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Joseph stycos, saw contraception as against religion and
harmful to the future of their country. They surpassed them-
selves in rhetoric concerning United States assistance in
birth control, contending that American imperialists were
envious of their ､ ･ Ｎ ｲ Ｚ Ｚ Ｎ ﾷ Ｚ ｪ ＿ ［ ｲ Ｈ ｾ ｰ ｨ ｩ ｣ vigor and v.rere attempting genocide
through the pill ｡ ｮ ｾ the IUD. Such rhetorical overkill was/
heard on all continents.
Echeverria became president of Mexico in 1970 on a
pronatalist platform. He promised to populate the country,
to fill its empty speces. But ,.,.,i thin three years of asst.uning
power he removed pre-existing bans on bil:th control and gave
up all reference to 8mpty spaces. In Mexico as elsewhere in
the 19705 the notion of population as a ..,eapon has been quietly
interred and birth control is being actively disseminated.
India is proceeding to comp.ulsory s·terilization. Americans
and Swedes on family planning missions find doors open to them
nearly everywhere. vmy has the 'old policy been reversed?
The first reason is urbanization. As rural areas have
filled and climbed up on their food supplies, movement to the
ci ties has accelerat.ed. The growth of cities in the poor
countries not on1y dominates the statistics, but is the domi-
nant impression of every visitor to countries from Indonesia
to Egypt to Brazil. Peasants who could be hungry in a distant
countryside without causing a ripple now become a genuine
problem to their elites, for overpopulation no longer takes
the form of the sharing of poverty and patient malnutrition, but
threatens political action in the capital itf:elf. Echeverria
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observed that the increments of population do not go out ｴ ｾ
pioneer in the jungle, undertake ｨ ｯ ｮ ｾ ｳ ｴ ･ ｡ ､ ｩ ｮ ｧ Ｌ or build with
their own ｨ ｡ ｮ ､ ｾ Ｇ Ｎ ｩ ｲ ｲ ｩ ｧ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｢ ｮ projects in the dry areas, but ,
prefer rather to come to ·t·1ex'ico City ,mo make themselves t.he
problem of their government. He suddenly realized that he
had overpopulation on his hands, a realization duplicated by
governments around the ,....orld.
The abruptness of the move into the ｣ ｩ ｴ ｩ ･ ｾ is increased
by a feature of the drop in mortality, which fell suddenly in
many bountries in the early 1950s. The effect was similar to
that of a baby boom as far as survivors into their twenties
about the present time is concerned. The effect is particu-
larly striking in Eastern South Asj.a, where we find for both
sexes together in 1975
.Pdpulation
in
1>.ge . thousands
0-4 4988
5-9 4197
10-14 3583
15-19 3074
20-24 2657
25-29 2067
30-34 1936
35-39 1833
40-44 1644
Difference
791
614
509
417
590
131
103
189
The drop in first di fferences aft.er age 25 needf: no unck'rlinj]l:i.
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This matter is complicated by errors in enumeration of the
national censuses on which Ulese united Nations ｲ ･ ｧ ｩ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｬ
numbers are based, and the effect does not appertr clearly in
ei ther /I.fr ica or Latin 1'.merica. But where it. does appear it
must have political consequences: large youth cohorts, better
educated than their parents, of an age and disposition to
migrate to cities, are bound to exert pressures that will not
accord with the policies of their seniors in power.
Some urbanization was occurring in the 1960s and did
not cause changes of policy in the direction of birth control.
The population problem was present all along, but in some
aspects was effectively concealed by concessionary sales of
United States grain. By an unspoken coincidence of objectives
between the U.S. Congress and the elites of poor countries,
surplus grain was shipped and received abroad, often paid for
in rupees and rupiahs y,i th the promise that the payee would
never spend the paper money. Such transactions were equivalent
to gifts, and their amounts were substantial.
In the mid-1960s India received united States grain at
a rate of over 10 million metric tons of graln per year--at
440 pounds per person it was enough to provide for 50 million
people, principally in the; port cities. This local availability
of grain, along with an internal pricing policy that lowered
prices at the farm, accelerated rural-urban migration. It
seemed impossible to administer the imported grain to help
the people already in the cities v,i thout drawing more people.
This process concealed the population problem at the
11 ')
J ••
t ' 't ｾ Ｇ ｜ ｉ ｾ ｾ Ｍ ｾ J'4. ｂ Ｇ ｵ ｾ ｴ Ｎ ｬ Ｍ Ｌ ｾ Ｎ ｃ ｃ Ｉ Ｑ ﾷ Ｈ ｾ Ｈ ＾ ｾ Ｎ ﾷ Ｑ Ｎ ｾ ｾ Ｑ Ｑ ﾷ ｴ ･ ｮ ､ ｣ ｾｾ Ｚ ［ ilmC J.l.ie as 1 ｡ＹｾｪＮｌ c1 CJ l.I:.:'-I _ \... c ,-. ,- - ""CC,
ｾ ［ ｩ Ｍ Ｚ Ｎ ｡ ｲ ｰ ｬ ｹ in 1973 Ｇ Ｏ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ the ｣ ｸ ｨ ｡ ｵ ｾ ｾ ｴ Ｎ ｩ ｯ ｮ of U.S. surplnses. Hc:nce···
forth grain had to be pz,j.d for, and bC'caw?c the same ｰ ｲ Ｈ Ｉ ｃ Ｘ Ｎ ｾ ｩ ｓ
of populat.ion ｩ Ｎ ｮ ｣ Ｚ ｲ Ｈ ｾ ｡ ｳ ･ was occurring :Ln Burma., Thailand, and
other former exporting countries, the m.unher of suppliers
on the world market sharply declined. Grain prices rose to
$250 per ton and higher.
The population problem became visible as it was directly
translated into cash terms. If a shortage occurred, so that
the last 10 per cent of the population ｨ ｾ ､ to be provided for
Ly purchases on the world market, then India would have to lay
out something like $2.5 billion. To see the magnitude of thi.s
in Indian terms, one has only to note that total exports in
1973 were $2.9 billion. Since exports are a gross figure,
including the re-export of some imports, one can say that in
､ ･ ｦ ｡ ｵ ｬ ｾ of local production, the margjnal 10 per cent of
population would require all of India's import capacity.
West Germany's exports in be same year 1973 were valued
at $69 billion, and her imports at $56 billion; shq could
have fed her population luxuriously on imported foodstuffs
without seriously interfering with her other imports. This
aspect of the population problem need be of no concern to
developed countries, but nonetheless an undercurrent of worry
ran through British economics, even wIlen British industry
was ahead of all others, about whether it would always be
possjble to trade coal and steel for grain. j'ihat, SOIT,'? econo-
misU, ｰ Ｇ Ｒ ｲ ｳ ｩ ｾ ｴ ｣ ､ in <1skinCj, if countd.es thilt supplied Lritclin
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VIi th its food J especially tIlt": United States, tlJemselves
industriillizc,,:? HOVl then \'JOl..llc1 Britain be able to feed its
30 million pEopJ.e? .
The TIw.:n point is thilt urba.nization I v;i th its poli t.ical
and economic consequenc2s, now reveal to governments through-
out the 'l'hird ｾ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｬ ､ the nature of: the population problem,
and they are taking action. Since reproduction is an intimate
matter, no one knows how effective their a.ction will be.
France, trying in the opposite direction, did not have much
success is raising her birth rate. But governments are not
pm·".erless to Lake what is dear to the conn'cry come t.O seem
dear to the individual family. They have a wide range of
positive and n2gative incentives. One must suppose that their
new reillization of the problem will show in an ｡ ｣ ｣ ･ ｬ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ｾ
fall of birth rates.
These somewhat gerieral considerations will now be
translated ｩ ｮ ｾ ｯ specific projections.
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7 A General ncthod <md Computer ｐ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｾ ｅ Ｌ ｉ ｾ
7.1 Proj ectinq i", ｳ ｾ Ｉ ｭ ｬ ＿ ｟ ＿ ｉ ｈ ﾷ ｭ ｴ Ｎ ｳ
To ､ ･ ｴ ･ ｲ ｭ ｩ ｾ Ｇ ｪ ･ fut"tJ.re ni.ortali ty \..'0. vlOrk from the fClCt
that some countri es Ｚ ｾ Ｎ Ｚ ］ ｴ ｶ ･ Cl gain of almost one year in
for each calendc:r 'Y ＺｾＺｾｾ that ｧ ｯ ｣ ｾ ｳ hy. 'i'his does not mean
that their ci ｴ ｩ Ｗ Ｎ ｾ ｮ ｳ 'dill live forever, since most of the
increase is due to ｩ ｭ ｰ ｲ ｯ ｶ Ｈ ｾ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ at the youngest ages, which
will have to stop somewbere before mortality zero is reached.
To begin with the percentage decrease of f.1. , the5 x
Clge-speci fie den th rate, we recoqni zc that such ｣ Ｑ ･ ｣ ｮ ｾ ｡ ｳ ｣
cannot possibly be as great at the older ages as at the ｹ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｳ ｾ ｾ
ones, and at the very oldest ages it seems to fall to zero.
For the youngest ages a 15 per cent fall per 5 years seems a
reasonable average over a variety of times and places; suppose
for age x we call the fall 0.15(1 - ｬｾｏＩ
as a fraction
of 5Mx'
But we need to adjust for the fact that the higher the
expectation of life the smaller the rate of fall. Thus the
historical record suggests that the decline of mortality under
present medical conditions may be approaching zero when we
are up to"age 75, and be three times as rapid at eO = 45 as
at
{75
o
eO = 65.
- eO)/20
This would be allowed for by applying the factor
to the preceding.
Finally, the rate of fall is more rapid the more recently
it occurs. Europe's fall in the 19th century ,,,as slO\<ier than
today' s, if for- no other :reaf.>on than t.he intro0.uc tion of Clll ti-
hiotics. A rough way of allowing for this is to apply th2
factor
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(t. - 1800) /100, \vhcre t is the calendar year.
Put.t.ing all this toget.her gives £01: the fractional
decrease in the age-specific
qua.ntity
11 at last, birthday the
n x
v1here the init'ial ,projection is from the calendar year t - 5
to t, and the expect.iJ.tion of life at calendar year t - 5
is Thus if the projcctj.on from time t - 5 to t \vCl.S
by a life table based on 11 , that from time: t to time
11 x
t + S \-iOuld be ｢ ｡ ｳ Ｈ ｾ ､ on H (1 _. o).n x
One could ｩ ｲ ｾ ｬ ｣ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ this by rccalculatj.ng the life
table in each cycle of projection, or else approximately bv
modifying L / L taking jot to the power 1 - 6:5 x+5 5 x '
! ,\ 1-6SI.x +S SL -j t": )\ y. -:>--L"-' = -L-5 x t 5 >: t-5/
In fact no universal formula such as the above can be
found that will provj,de a good fit to all times and places.
The most that can be said for it is that it takes account. of
some main variables, that it is ｳ ｵ ｾ ｴ ･ ､ to computation with no
need for the operator to make ad hoc adjustments, and most
important, that it is an explici t set of assumptions tha'c are
subject to criticism and improvement. The cormnodity may not
be very good, but at least the consumer can kriow exactly what
he is getting.
['or fert.ili ty t.l:c di ff ieul tics are even greater, ancl
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variations in the ｩ Ａ ｳ ｳ ｜ ｊ ｲ Ｎ ［ Ｉ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ J"il,,].:e even r.Dre difference to
the result. l3ut ｳ ｵ ｰ ｰ ｯ ｾ Ｚ ｣ \..'e assume that all populations \'Ji11
be down to bare ｲ ･ ｰ ｬ ｡ ｣ ｅ ｲ ｮ ｾ ｮ ｴ by the end of the century, and
that they wil], drop in a straight line. If the last period
for which data are to be had is 1970-5, this means that we
must arrange five drops in fertility, to the final conditj.on
in which the Net Reproduction Rate RO is unity. This last
that the fall is greater at the oldest ages.
Ｕ ｾ ), etc.
o
But we knO\v
is arranged by setting the rates at each age equal to Px/RO
and the intermediate aqe-specific rates at F (i + __1_)
- x 5 5R 'o
A factor that allovls for -this is x/30, \'lhich can be applied
to each age, at the cost of requiring iteration if the point
of replacement is to be exactly the interval 1995-2000. It
would be better to have the rates drop slowly at first, then
more rapidly, then slowly again.
Migration is a relatively small fraction for the ｬ ｡ ｲ ｧ ｾ
populations of Asia. Europe has had some in-migration, Dut
it is offset by out-migration to the United States and else-
where. The one area where migration makes an appreciable net
difference is Northern ｬ ｾ ･ ｲ ｩ ｣ ｡ and Oceania, where its total
has reached as high as a million per year.
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\'10RLD POPULlI.TION, 2000-2050
Surrunary
Table 1 shows our low and high estimates for the three
categories of less developed countries (LDC's). The bottom
line for the year 2050 is 5,099.5 for the low figure, and
7,184.5 for the high, all in millions. Adding the 1,400
millions for the developed countries (on which all estimates
agree closely) qives u range of 6,500 to 8,600 millions for
the world population in the year Ｒ Ｐ Ｕ Ｐ ｾ the ultimate world
population on this scheme would Le very little hiejhC:L·. The
low of 6,500 is ｄ ｾ ｳ ･ ､ on mortality continuing to fall and
replacement (two children per coupJ.e surviving t6 maturity)
being reached Ly 1995; the high estimate assumes this condi-
tion will be reached by 2015.
These numbers straddle the Harld }Jank A figure, \\Thich
is 8,136 million for tlJe year 2050, and our high is slightly
below the united Nations low figure. The result agrees with
the implications of Lester R. Brown's recent (1976) paper. It
represents a groYling consensus thut: if birth rates have not
dropped to replacement ear!y in the 21st century, then death
rates will rise sUhstantiully.
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TABLE 1 Less Developed Countries projected to 2050 by sex,
assuming declining mortality and fertility down to
bare replacement by 1995 (Low estimate) and by
2015 (High ･ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｭ ｾ ｴ ･ Ｉ Ｌ millions of persons
Oil
exporters
Other
LDC's
> $400
income
per head*
Other
LDC's
< $400
income
per head
Total
LDC's
Low Estimate
1975
Hale 143.6 162.5 1134.1 1440.2
Female 144.7 161.9 1089.4 1396.0
Total 288.3 324.4 2223.5 2836./.
2000
Hale 208.2 229.5 1613.3 2051.0
Female 215.4 232.5 1584.7 2032.6
Total 423.6 4G2.0 3198.0 4083.6
2025
Male 248.4 272.9 1909.3 2430.6
Female 262.2 281. 2 1916.6 2460.0
Total 510.6 554.1 3825.9 4890.6
2050
Hale 256.4 280.9 1976.7 2514.0
Female 275.5 292.9 2017.1 2585.5
'fotal 531. 9 573.8 3993.8 5099.5
ＬｾＮ ,
TABLE l--Continu0d
］ ］ ］ ］ ］ ］ Ｍ Ｍ ］ ］ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｍ ］ Ｍ ］ ］ Ｎ
Oil
exporters
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Other
LDC's
> $400
income
per head*
Other
LDC's
< $400
income
per head
Total
LDC's
High Estimate
1975
Male 143.6 162.5 1134.1 1440.7.
Female 144.7 161. 9 1089.4 1396.0
Total 288.3 324.4 2223.5 2836.2
2000
Male 246.0 250.0 1909.3 2405.3
Female 252.7 252.3 1874.9 7.379.9
Total 498.7 502.3 3784.2 4785.2
2025
11ale 330.2 316.7 2526.3 3173.2
Female 341. 8 ＳＲＲＮｾ 2525.6 3189.6
Total 672.0 638.9 5051.9 6362.£3
2050
ｾ Ｑ ｡ ｬ ･ 371.1 342.6 2839.6 3553.3
Fema]e 389.5 351. 6 2890.1 3631.2
Total 760.6 694.2 5729.7 7184.5
-----_.,
*24 countries listed in report of November 26, 1976.
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Program for Life Table and Population Projection
ｾ ｨ ･ program that follows (Table 2), written in Fortran
IV, provides an estimate of future population, for males and
females separately, in five-year intervals, for 100 years.
The age intervals can be condensed; males and females added;
the period of projection lengthened or shortened.
The changes in mortality and fertility that are assumed
follow simple rules, the same for all populations. For mor-
tality the fall takes place at a pace that is more rapid the
lower the initial expectation of life, the later the calenrtar
year, and the younger the ｡ ｧ ｾ Ｎ For fertility the ｦ ｾ ｬ ｬ is
tuk8n to be proportional at ().ll ages, and to drop to bare
replacement in 20, 30, and ｾ ｏ years, these giving low, medium,
and high variants of the ｦ ｵ ｴ ｕ ｬ ｾ ･ population. (Details in tbe
memorandum of November 26, 1976, "Population of the Horld and
Its Regions, 1975- 20 50. ") '1'he program is appli cable \vi thout
modification to any population, and preliminar.y experimenting
shows it to fit reasonably well ｾ ｯ the changes in mortality
and fertility that have occurred in the past.
Input to the program consists of the population, deaths,
und births of the jumping-off time, in our first application
mid-1975. Five-year age groups, with ° und 1-4 at last birth-
day shown separately and 85 and over as a single item, are
the input categories. In this Ci1se the deat:hs are for 1970--1.
Births are for both sexes together, in five-year intervals of
a9c of mother.
The input cards are di vi.cled. into 8-·coJ.umn f iclc1s, and
""
"
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are as follows:
Card 1 Females, population 0, 1-5, 5-9, •.• , 40-44, in
columns 1-8, 9-16, 17-24, etc.
2 Females, population 45-49, 50-54, ••• , 85+, in
columns 1-8, 1-18, ••• , and total of all ages in
columns 73-80
II s 3 and 4 Same for deaths
" s 5 and 6 Description of data set
7 Jumping-off year, in columns 1-4
8 Number of 5-year periods of p:r:ojection required,
n
n
II
columns 1-2
9 Sex ratio at birth, typically 1.05, in columns 1-4
s 10 and 11 NumbeI' of births t:o \'iOInen of euch age,
using same fields as for population and deaths,
i.e., ages 15-19, •.. , in columns 33-40, etc.
s 12-20 SarnA for males, except without birth cards
Preceding all of these data cards is a sinqle card giving
the nUITlber of 5-year cyc les to replacement, punched in COltlPITI 8.
Population, Deat.Its, o.t:d Births By Age:
The united Nations compilations of current data are the
best available, and vw used them for population, deaths, and
births. These gave five-year age intervals up to age 80, and
we wanted 0 .and 1-4 at last ｢ ｩ ｲ ｴ ｨ ｾ ｡ ｹ Ｌ as well as 80-84 and
85 and over, at least for making the life table, though not
for the projection. To make (1 rough alloHance for ·the trend
of births, the 0 was calculated by first finding the ratio of
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Tl\BLE 2 I'ortran program for proj ec tion
DATE = 76351 17127/0)
II I ﾷﾷＱＱｾ ｾＮＺ S I (iN P I 1 >:) I ,L\ ,) ( .i. ,'j ) , ,', L ( 19 ) , CP L ( 1 Ｎｾ ) , L Pl S ( 19 , 11 , :2 ) , :: ( 1 '1) , Ｎｾ ( 1 L)) ,
l. :. ( 3 ) , U ( ,j J , C( 1"; J , [. [L ( is ) ,3 ( 1'/ ) , F ( 19 , 1 1) , PP ( 15 , , l.) , F f M( 2 1, 11 )
( ｾｕｾ IS THE ｾｊｾｾｅｾ OF FIvC ｙ ｅ ｾ ｋ PERIO:S ｕ ｾ ｔ ｉ ｌ ｾ ｅ ｐ ｌ ａ ｃ ｅ ｾ ｅ ｎ ｔ
C ｆｅｾｔｉｌｉｔｙ IS ｫ ｦ ａ ｃ ｲ ｬ ｾ ｄ ?L0S ｏ ｾ ｅ
Dol 1000 l C(JJNT ］ Ｑ Ｌ ｾ
REs\ D (5,3 15) NU ｦｾ
'3 1 5 F(l Q,I.; A T (I in
DU 310 r"F =1 , 2
no :.JJ K.(JUf\lT= 1, ｎ ｵ ｲ ｾ
CALL lIfE (P, AL, CPL ,<IJU\lT, 8fL, 4,\1, E)
T=17S+ 5*KllU'H
·T =T 11 00.
T ｜ｾ F:" i"1F
T=T-':(l./TMF)
Du 300 I=1,1':J
CPLS( I, KOU\T Ｌ ｾ ｉ ｉ ｆ Ｉ =CPU I)
IF (1-2) 301,302,303
3\Jl J=J
G8 T,] 304
ｪ ｾ ｌ J::1
G8 TO 304
Ｓ ｊ ｾ J=5Y.CI-Z)
304 C:Jf\ir I r.;ur
J0G ｏ ｾ ｌ ｉ ｉ Ｉ ］ ｔ ｾ ﾫ Ｗ ｪ Ｎ Ｍ ｅ Ｈ ｬ Ｉ ｊ Ｏ ｚ ｏ Ｎ Ｉ ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｕ Ｊ Ｈ Ｑ Ｎ Ｍ Ｎ Ｐ Ｑ Ｊ ｆ ｌ ｏ ａ ｔ Ｈ ｊ ｉ Ｉ
210 CALL PFDJ Li',AL,CPLS,FF 1l,;lF,r:U;·1)
1 CJ) C. iJ i'n I ｲｾ UE
STOP
END
l I r- E:: D!\ 1T = -((1357
SUlH' au TINELI FE (P , .\ L , LPL , 1< UIJ NT, n r.: L. , /\ ｾＧＺ , [- )
LJ I ｾＧｆ ｴｾ S ION II ( 19) , ｴ｜ｾ ..1( 19) ,AL ( L9) ,c rL (1 ejj , f. (1 CJ) ,Q (19)
1 , A ( 3 J , ｾｩ ( "' ) , f) ( 1 '7 ) , r: EL ( 1 9 )
ｾｾ E ..ｾ l ｾＨ 11 T", ｾｾ l [ ( :) j
I.' f. Al"- 8 TIT l E( 4 )
C. TA13 L E MW TIT L E t-1t. vf. fH ｅ Ｚ Ｇ ｾ Df. S I G' J t: D T[) ALt. J ｾｉ THE US [ R
r S[':·1;:' ChOICE Pol L\I:ELLH.G THE LH:r: T!\::'>lE. ｾ ｗ ｉ Ａ ｜ ｪ ｔ ｆ ｾ Ｇ ｩ ｔ ｛ ｇ Ｚ ｾ
( 1ST rl.\ T T.\ P, L:: b i= USc) I. S t, i J I ｲＬｾ J T J AL TIT U: L 1 KEll 1 F E
C ｔｾｾｌｦＮ FUR:', PHI TITl.E ｾ ｆ usrl) TO lcWrU.TE Trlt: ＧｾａｔｌｊｐＮｅ
C 0 f THr LJ t, T /.. •
INTfut " D,P
I i· Ｈｉｾ [j UI. T • (, r • 1) G(I T,) (t
!'FAn Ｈ ｾ Ｌ Ｑ Ｑ Ｉ (PlI),I=I,lO)
:/fAiJ (5,11) (P(!),I::ll,1'·d
FEAP (5,11) (D(!J,1=l,10)
P f All (:" 11) () ( 1 ) ,1 =1 1 , 10.) J
11 ｲ ｩ Ｎ ｬ ［ Ｇ Ｉ Ｎ Ａ ｾ Ｚ Ｇ ｔ (luIS)
n:l11=1,19
1'(1) = P(])*, 1000
Df.Ul)::O.
1 t. ｲｾ ( I I =F L ､Ｌｾ 1 ( [) ( I ) ) 1F LJ AT( P ( I ) )
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4 0:12,:> 1=1,19
ｾ Ｇ ［ ａ Ｇ ｾ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ ］ ｍ Ｑ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ Ｂ Ｈ ｬ Ｎ Ｍ ｏ ｦ ｌ Ｈ ｉ ﾻ
",L(1)=12'JOOO.
A( \)=.07+1. 7"'tA:l( 1)
A(2)=1.S
ａ Ｈ ｪ Ｉ ］ Ｒ Ｎ ｾ
N(1)=1
ｾ ［ Ｈ Ｒ Ｉ ］ Ｔ
N( 3)=5
G;:J 7 I=lp ,
t. L ( I +- I ) =AL( 1 ) '1 ( 1 - A( I ) *t. ｾｾ ( I ) ) I ( 1 t ( ｾ ｾ ( I ) - A( 1 ) };' AM ( I ) )
7 CP II 1 )=(AL( I ) - AI. ( I ... 1 ) ) / A!'1 ( I )
DC! 2 I =4,1 7
2 j), L( I ... 1 ) =AL( I ) ¢ t XP ( - 5 .. G.:J\ t I ) +- 5;,r ( p ( ! ... 1 ) - P ( 1-1 ) ) '" ( A'-, ( I+-1 )
I-A,""( !-1»/(4S:::P(1 »}
AL ( un =ｾ L( 1 8 ) ｾＺ .x p (- ｾ '-'< AH ( 1 3 ) l' ｾ ｾ Ｌ ( ｾＩ ( 1c )- 4 :f., i> (l 7 ) ... 3 Ｉｾ r ( 1 i:l ) )
1 r. ( AH ( I 6 ) - 4 ｾ .:- '., ( 1 -, ) ... 3 ｾ .HH 1 d} ) II 4 fl·'\: 0 ( Ｑｾ ) } )
DU j [=4,lt
3 Cr l ( I ) =ｾ >:< ( AL ( 1 ) - ｾ L ( 1 +- 1 ) ) *- ( 1 ... :>:: ( !" 'v' ( I ... 1 ) - A,',1 ( I - i ) ) I 2 4 ) I
1.\ LOG ( to L ( I )f AL ( 1+ 1 ) }
CPL(19)=AL(1g)/AM(19)
T8T=0.0
00 b 1= 1,19
8 TUT:::TlJT"'CPUI}
E( l)=TOT/AL( 1)
00 ') I:: 2, 19
i,i( 1-1) ］ ｬ Ｍ Ｌ ｾ ｌ Ｈ I ) I AL {I-I)
TlJT = T(l T-(, PL ( 1 -1 )
'i ｾ Ｈ ｉ ｽ ］ ｬ ｇ ｔ Ｏ ｴ Ｎ ｬ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ
(.'(19)=1.
IF ＨｋｾｕｎｔＮｇｔＮＱＩ GO TJ 24
F'EAD(':>,20) TA\3LE
2 ,J FUF'.t'\AT(3A8}
ｾ ｑ ｉ ｔ ｅ Ｈ Ｖ Ｌ Ｒ Ｑ Ｉ TAhlE
21 r:OR'·U.T('l',IIIIIIIIII' ',45Xd,\.;f)
ｾ ｅ ａ ｄ ｻ Ｕ Ｌ Ｒ Ｒ Ｉ TITLE
22 H.1 Rfl.1 AT (4 Ad)
ｮ ｾ ｉ ｔ ｅ Ｈ Ｖ Ｌ Ｒ ｾ ｽ TITLE
2;' ｆ ｕ ｾ ｴ Ｂ ａ ｔ Ｈ Ｑ ',45X,4Ao)
24 CONTI t'lUE
We{ IT E( () , 1 ｾ )
15 ｆ ｑ ｒ ｾ ａ ｔ Ｈ Ｏ ｉ Ｇ Ｇ Ｌ Ｓ Ｒ ｸ Ｌ ｉ ｘ Ｇ Ｌ ｾ ｘ Ｌ ｉ ｐ Ｇ Ｌ ｴ ｬ ｘ Ｌ Ｇ ｄ Ｇ Ｌ Ｙ ｘ ｴ Ｇ ｏ Ｇ Ｌ Ｙ ｘ Ｌ Ｇ Ｑ Ｈ ｘ Ｉ ｉ Ｌ ｒ ｘ Ｌ
L'l' ,l2X,'E'IIJ
U:.J 5 I = I , 19
I!=- (I-.:) IL, 13,14
1 L J= 0
GD T:J 5
1.,:, J=1
GU TU ｾ
1 4 J =Ｚ［ｾＢ I - 2 )
5 \·i O. I T ｾ ( b ,6) J, P ( I ) , D( J ) ,(J I I ) , AL ( I ) , CP L ( I ) , E( I )
6 ｲｕｾｍａｔＨＧ ',lDX,13,lIU,fll.6,lFll.J,F1l.3)
RrTUrHI
L'oJO
P;",:IJ
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DATE = 703':>7
su;.> ;-<, ·>U T I:" ｾ ?"':J J ('" , AL , :. p '_ ｾ , F:: ｾｉ , :,1 F , t'., U ｾ )
DI ｾ 1E- ｾ j So I 0 ｾｉ f· ( 1 =1 } , ;\ L ( 1 :J ) , C.? L S( i 9 , L l , 2) , 8 ( 1 'J) , F ( 19 , 1 1) ,
1PP ( 1b , 2 1 ) , r ｾ .., ( 21 , 11 ) , SLJ >1 :-1 ( 11 ) , p p p ( '2 1 )
ＲＬｎｔｅｾｐＨＱＸＩＬｾｲｒＨＲＱＩ
;E AL S
ｉｾｔｅｇｾｒ ｂＬｬＬｚｉＬｐＬｓｔｾｾｔＬｆ｛ｎＬｾｆ
C .. START IS fHE yEAR AT WHICH TrlE ｐｒｕｊｅｃｔｉｏｾ ｂｅｾｉｎｓ
KE:'D (S,ll3L,.., \ START
1131 FOk'-IAT (14)
C· l IS THE ｎｕｾＸｆＮｒ UF FIVE ｙ ｅ ａ ｾ pnOJECTIONS TJ BE ｾａｏｅ
ｒｅｾｄ (5,ll2i.,..- I I
112' ｆ ｏ ｾ ｍ ａ ｔ (12)
leo FORMAT (lOId) .
C S IS THE SEX ｾａｔｉｏ
R'=.M)(5,410) S
ｾｬｏ ｆｏｐｾａｔＨｆｓＮ｢Ｉ
I F (t 1f- • EQ • ｾ ) GOT C 3 5 iJ
wRITE(6,1':»)
150 r:JRM;'\T ('1' ,/1111/1111' ',lOX,'POPULATIO:'II BIRTH FEi{TILlTY
1 ',11)
READ (5,IJO) (8(1),1=1,lQ)
ｾ ｅ ａ ｄ (5,100> (B(I ),1=11,19)
DO 1(J 1 1= 1 , 19 .
B ( I) = (I ( I) <- 1 000
f( I,l)=flOAT{dlI ｉ ｉ Ｏ ｆ ｬ Ｌ ｏ ｾ Ｌ ｔ Ｈ ｐ Ｈ 1) I
101 F( [,l)=f(I,L)/(l.+$)
RO=O.
Rl=O.
DO LO 1=4,11-
XI=Si.( 1-2)
XI"=XI+2.5
ｾ ｯ ］ ｲ ｏ Ｋ ｃ ｐ ｌ ｓ Ｈ ｊ Ｌ ｎ ｕ ｍ Ｌ ｍ ｆ ｊ Ｊ ｆ Ｈ Ａ Ｌ ｬ ｊ
2 0 ｾ 1 -= R1 +XI*CPLS ( I t Nｕｾｬ , ｾｉ r ) >:' F ( [ II )
K\J=RO/IOOOJJ.
1J.l =C{1/1 00000.
XNUf·l= 5*- (NU\.\-l)
ｘ ｍ ］ ｬ ｪ ｏ Ｎ Ｏ ｘ ｎ ｊ ｾ Ｉ Ｊ Ｈ ｌ Ｎ Ｍ ｒ ｏ Ｉ Ｏ ｾ ｬ
DO Ｒｾ J=2,NJ"\
DO 25 1=1,19
Xl=5*([-2)
XI=XI+2.S
XT=5 i,t(J-lJ
"L 5 r ( I, J ) =(1. + X. "1 t XI Ｉｾ XT/3 J. ) ｾ F ( I ,j )
002101=1,NJ"1
210 ｳ ｵ ｾ Ｎ Ｌ ｾ ﾷ ｱ I ) =0.
[H) 215 J=l,\Jjtl
DJ ｾ ｬ ｾ J=4,l't
X[=5"{!-2)
21 ｾ $U ＧｾｲＬＺ ( J ) = SU',t '1 ( J ) +. 0::> ｾ J 1'" CP LS ( I , J , nr- P F ( I ,J )
DO 700 J=l, ｩ ｾ ｕ ｍ
DO 1() ｾ ! = 1 , 111
IF (f-( ｬ Ｌ ｊ ｉ Ｎ ｇ ｦ Ｎ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ ｏ Ｉ GJ T] liJ5
H1 P =().,
LE.\ SF 2. J PI" 'JJ
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[.'\Tf = 7&J':J7 17/27/0
OJ 706 ｋ ］ ｉ Ｌ ｬ ｾ
rr Ｈ ｲ Ｈ ｬ Ｇ Ｚ Ｌ ｊ ｊ Ｎ Ｇ Ｚ ［ ｾ Ｎ ｊ Ｎ ｊ ｊ ,;.' T"' D()
.\ ｾ I Tc ({), (1J) :<., J , ;: ( \. , J )
71 C f- G Ｚｾ l-lt, T (2 Xtl 3 rl:'1) J L!S"f Fe K , J) ,::;' X ,2 I 5 , F 12 • 6, I Il
T." p= T '·U) +-. J J J J 1 *' CP LS ( I, , J, ;F ) *,;:: ( K, J)
7C6 CUNTlNUF
DC 707 Ｌ Ｌ ］ ｬ Ｌ ｬ ｾ
7 J 7 ;: ( K, J I =F( K , J ) *SU:-, t·; ( J ) I ( SU '1'1 ( J ) - Trw )
DU 708 K=Itl:.l
IF (F(K,J).;f.J.01 JJ TO 708
F(K,JI=O.
7C€ ｃ ｴ ｊ ｎ ｔ ｉ ｾ ｕ ｲ
SUWI/1( J) =J.
au 7Q9 K=1,19
Ｗ ｃ ｾ ｓ ｕ ｍ ｍ Ｈ ｊ Ｉ ］ ｓ ｕ ｾ ｾ Ｈ ｊ Ｉ Ｋ Ｎ ｏ ｊ ｊ ｑ Ｑ Ｄ ｃ ｐ ｌ ｓ Ｈ ｋ Ｌ ｊ Ｌ ｾ ｆ Ｉ Ｊ ｆ Ｈ ｋ Ｌ ｊ Ｉ
GO TO 70J
705 Cu:-n I NUf
7eG LUIH I i'lU='
[tl) 2v? 1=1,lY
.!. 0 ｾ ,.;" 1T t (6 t 2 J ) ) P ( 1 I , l', ( I ) , ( f- ( I , oJ ) , J:,: 1 , ;':u i'l I
2 GC F(j ｣ ｾ ;-.j to T l' " 1 0 XtI 1 8 , r- 1 o. t.. I iX, ［ ｾ Ｌ f- 1:). tl
'1'1 ｾ IT f (6 , 2:;' 1) (S U ｈＢｾ ( J ) , J =1 I i! u:·\ )
.: U1 r:.1 ｾｦｾ t. T (II, l.. 1X , F 10. ｾ ｉ , 2 X , t\ t 1 J • 6 l
ｾｪｊ ClJi-.TIMJf
PP(1,11=P,1)+P(Z)
Vl 102 1 =2,1 8
102 PP(I,l)=P(I+-l.)
II =I +- 1
DD 103 J=2,ll
C IF JJ=J-1, TrlE ｮ Ｓ ｓ ｅ Ｚ ｾ ｖ ｅ ｄ ｲ ｾ Ｚ ［ Ｇ ｾ Ｌ ｔ ｲ ｌ Ａ ｔ ｙ Ａ ｾ ｎ ｑ I.!f-r;: TA8LE ａ ｬ ｾ ｅ USED
C FuR THE F I ｾ S T (, Y(. L f (J ｾ tJ ;.' Q J f. (T Ir1 !'i
C
C IF JJ=J, THEY ARE NJT
JJ =J
IF ｬ ｊ ｊ Ｎ ｇ ｔ Ｎ ｾ ｊ ｾ Ｉ ｊ ｊ ］ ｎ ｕ ｾ
PP ( 2 , J ) =P P ( 1 , J -1 ) ｾ｣ r L S ( 3 , J ,I , ［Ｎｾ F ) I (C f' l Ｚｾ ( 2 f J J , r' r) ;. CP L S ( 1 , J J , Mr) )
[Ii] 1'04 I =:i,18
104 PP ( 1 , J ) =PP I 1- 1 , J - 1 ) ,;, :::. i> LS ( I ｾＮ 1 , J J , 11 r: ) Ie fJ LS ( I ,J J , 1·1/- )
IF 0-1F.tQ.2) GO TO 4JO
SUt-1=O. a
00 10? I=3,l ....
105 SUf>l=SUt"+(PP(I-l,J-l)"'i:(FI !r,l..! H-
I ( ( CPLS ( I .. 1 , J J f r·: F- ) Ie \; L :; ( ! , .J ) f '.\ r I ) ::. F { 1 +1 ,. i J I J ) ,
p p ( 1 , J ) =0 • ;, (, ( ::. r L S ( 1 , J J , 1·\ F ) T ,: iJ l S { ;, I .J •.1 , i·',:: ) ) :', ｾ U;A / P. L ( 1 )
GO Tf] 10J
4CC ｃ ｬ Ａ ［ ｾ ｔ ｊ ｉ ｗ ｉ ［
Pp ( 1 , J ) =S J'e ( : i> L S ( 1 , J J , r·\ F I j ｩＺｾＧ L .; ( 2 , .J.J I ＧＮｾ I ) ). ,; :- :: \i I J , J J ) I F i:: i'1 ( 1 , J .J )
10.> Cu"HI1iUF
f- It>! =STAF' T +- ( ｬｾＧ S)
IF (:-1F.EQ.2) GO T(I III
',.jRlTE(6,I10J S":"Ac.T,F!'J
ltv HJKi-iAT ('1',1/11' Ｑ Ｌ ｉ ｲ Ｍ ｅ Ｚ Ｇ ｾ ｌ ｃ Ｇ ｐ ｃ ｛ Ｉ Ｇ ｉ ｬ Ｎ Ｌ ｜ ｔ ｉ Ｈ Ｍ Ｇ ｾ ﾷ Ｌ Ｚ P:.:1J£:(TICN FtJ\IJ.\',I5,· TO'
1 , I S I
PPJJ
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171271,))
GO TO L12
111 ｶ ｾ ｒ ｉ ｔ ｅ (6,ilj) START,FI'J
113 ｆ ｃ ｒ ｾ ｉ ｴ Ｎ Ｗ ('1',1111' Ｇ Ｌ Ｇ ｾ Ｍ Ｑ ［ ｜ ｌ ｃ Ｚ ｐ Ｈ ｬ ｐ Ａ ｊ ｌ ｾ ｔ ｬ Ｈ Ｌ ［ Ｍ Ｎ ｪ PROJECTION F-RC/IoPdj,' T)'
1. I 5)
112 CONTIrJUE
no 120 J=l,lL.
120 PPP(J)=lJ •
. DO 1i 5 J =1• Zl
DO 125 1=1,10
12? ｐ ｐ ｐ Ｈ ｊ Ｉ ］ ｐ ｐ ｐ Ｈ ｊ Ｉ ｾ ｐ ｐ Ｈ ｉ Ｌ ｊ Ｉ
DO bUD 1=1,10
600 In Ei·l P ( t ) = 5 *' (1- 1 )
WRITE: (6,601) (tHEl-1P(I) ,1=1 ,10)
6 u1 FQI,V-l ｾ T (/ I I, ax, 1 J I 12, I I )
ｾｉｙ R( 1 ) = STAP T
DJ 005 1=2,ll
11=1-1
605 I'JYR(I)=NYR(II)+5
00 610 l=l,ZZ
610 WRITE (6,611) NYR(I), [PP(K,I) ,K=1,10J
611 ｆ ｏ ｾ ｍ ａ ｔ (/,2X,I4,5X,10FIL.a)
hR IT E «(., 6:J 2 ') (N T [1Y1 P( I ) tI =11 r 1UJ
602 F:) ｒｾｉａ T (' L' ,/111 , ex , tl I 12 ,13 X, 5 HT aT AL ,/1 )
DO (iLl) 1=I,Zl
L20 ｾ ｩ ｒ ｉ ｔ ｛ (&,621) JlyR(J), (PP(r<.,U,K=11,l6),PPP(I)
621 ｆ ｏ ｒ ｍ ｾ ｔ Ｈ Ｏ Ｌ Ｒ ｘ Ｌ ｉ Ｔ Ｌ Ｕ ｘ Ｌ Ｘ ｆ ｉ Ｒ Ｎ ｡ Ｌ ｾ ｸ Ｌ ｆ ｉ Ｒ Ｎ Ｐ ｊ
I F (i., F • EQ • 2) GI] T[) 3 1 0
DO 300 1=I,NJ"1 .
FE-1 ( 1 , I J =:: PLS( 1 , I , 14 F) +CPLS( 2 , I ,r.., F)
00 300 J=2,ZZ
._FEM(J,l)=PPll,J}
300 CO'\JT ItWF
310 c.onTINUE
RE TURN .-
Etw
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the 5-9 to the 0-4; then taking the fifth root of this, say A,
then calculating (1 - \)/(1 - A5 ) as the fraction of the under
5 to call under 1. To split the aD and over (ooP ao ), we took
5P70 ' 5P75 , P80 , and calculated
Having the exposed population of these ages for males
and females separately we then took the expectation of life
for the given sex and population group as provided by the
United Nations, and used the age-specific death rates of the
corresponding ｭ ｯ ､ ･ ｾ life table of the Coale and Demeny (1966)
West set. These were multiplied by the population to estimate
the number of deaths.
For births the Coale and Trussell (1974) model tables
were taken, using different mean age of childbearing (MEAN)
and standard deviation (STDEV) for developed and less devel-
oped regions. Those considered appropriate to the groups of
countries are as follows:
DC's
LDC's
MEAN
26.0
28.0
STDEV
5.5
6.5
Rl
0.2732
0.3196
Once the deaths and births for the three sUbgroups of
LDC's were obtained, the total of the LDC's was found by
addition, and similarly for the DC's. The world as a whole
was the sum of the DC's and LDC's.
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Other Estimates
As among existing calculations those of the United
Nations are most often quoted. These come in three variants,
of which only the middle variant is published in detail.
However, recent evidence shows that it is on the high side.
In particular a number of countries have shown birth statis-
tics that are lower than expected since the UN work was done
in 1973. The UN low variant is not published in any detail,
but I have been able to obtain from the United Nations the
breakdown into more and less developed regions, and these are
shown in Table 3. I would interpret these as an upper limit
on what the population will be. That means that for the
mid-21st century one can count on a world total under 9 billions.
Lester Brown has attracted wide attention in recent
months with his Report on World Population (October, 1976).
He argues that the United Nations estimates are much too high.
As evidence of this l1e cites the apparent rapid decline in the
birth rate in China, the unanticipated fall to negative popu-
lation growth in four European countries by 1975, and energetic
population control measures in Mexico, Egypt, and many other
countries of the Third World. He accepts that the world rate
of population increase, as high as 1.90 percent in 1970, had
fallen by 1975 to 1.64 percent.
It is not alone through the fall in the birth rate that
Brown anticipates a further rapid drop in the rate of increase.
ｓ ｯ ｭ ｾ recent upturns in national death rates, partly due to mal-
nutrition, seem likely to continue. Overgrazing, deforestation,
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TABLE 3 United Nations low estimate for the years 1975 to
2100, showing more and less developed regions;
millions of persons
More Less
developed developed
regions regions
Year (MDR) (LDR) World
1975 1132 2836 3968
2000 1314 4685 5999
2025 1405 6368 7773
2050 1410 7588 8998
j.,
.,
2075 1410 8052 9461
2100 1410 8139 9548
and ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｰ ｬ ｯ ｵ ｧ ｨ ｾ ｮ ｧ are to be found on all continenls, and
apparently the world ｦ ｩ ｾ ｨ catch has passed its peak. Rising
world food prices are bound to translate into rising death
rates in the poorest countries.
Demographers have by and large given up the search for
mathematical functions that will fit a past population and
predict the future, but such may incidentally complement the
work here using the components method. Roper (1976) provides
a generalization of the logistic or inverse hyperbolic tangenl.
His fitted world population goes to an asymptote of ahout
6 billion (Fig. 1).
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